Dysfunctional democracy and institutions in the «special case» of Greece and elsewhere in the West world

by George V. Ritzoulis

 

In Greek
 

What is the relationship between the way representative democracy is understood and practiced, the dysfunctions of the party- or generally political-system and the inefficiency of the state? For example in Greece, often called a «special case»-country or an «exception» within the euro zone.

To start discuss this question, let us think about the following short and very incomplete approach: To be a Greek citizen is a constitutional issue, namely to be member of the constituent body of the Greek polity, a republic.
In this perspective, the problem is as follows: since many decades in Greece, the party system as a whole and its functionaries, do not see themselves as representatives and «servants» of this constitutional entity, namely taking really into account also the majority of the citizens and not only its actual and potential clienteles. After any parlament election, the winners deal the state as booty. firstly for their milieus and every kind of «friends» in broader sence (not always ideological), and also for the closer standing professional groups or the more controlled and vulnerable to patronage ones.

© The New Yorker

«Children of superior and inferior gods» of democracy in Greece and elsewhere

Οver many decades, Greece belongs to rich countries in terms of average economic condition, ie GDP per capita (of course this being a virtual number, an indication for the economic output). However, as before with the so-called national currency, also now with the euro, this country suffered and continues equally to suffer from rather consistently strong social inequality and low social cohesion; this is a somehow US-type feature and not monopolized by countries once called the Third World. Like all peoples of the world, even in democracies, among the Greeks there are «children of different gods»; however, here, many people are unlucky enough to be «children of too inferior gods».

Besides this, because of a patronage state, permanently in favor of specific social milieus as well the state-cultivated and supported widespread corruption in Greece - this kind is endemic especially in most countries of Mediterranean and Balcan Europe, while the kind of corruption involving «big money», the so-called «diaploki» (interweaving), around which there is in a Greece so much hype without real result, is strong everywhere, even in Nordic countries -, all insiders are protected very well. Thus they were protected in the drachma era, so are now. 

The others; The political elites drive them into Caeadas without a second thought.

The worst and more difficult issue to adress, is that these political elites, working as executive body and agents in order to safeguard and preserve this disharmonious societal status quo, manipulate with very hard - but also sophisticated - ways the public sphere, implanting in this way a «false consciousness» to their electorates.

Not only the executive and the legislative (the latter has essentially resigned from its predicted role, ie. from the representation of large sections of society) act in this way. Unfortunately, many times the same way, as a safener in favor of insiders and and the last resort for them, acts in Greece and the third, the judiciary. About how synergize the Greek media, including the new digital, better let us not speak.

Critical dysfunction of democracy in Europe and America, a chaos beyond 

But, at the bottom line, this problem is not especially a Greek one. The underpinning cause is the current dysfunctionality of democracy - being caused by the too tight connection of the political and economical elites - everywhere, in Europe and America.The most tangible and most critical gap in representation, in national and European level, is everywhere the same; today is a constant in the West world: The «children of inferior gods» are not represented or are unterepresented; the result is cancellation of the «acquired» - historically earned and formed - typical characteristic of (Western European) democracy, the welfare state, but in practice is also being questioned the other, «genetic» founding feature of democracy in general: the legal, formal equality of citizens.  
The problem of non-representation - ie the most critical dysfunction of democracy today - is a pan-European and American one, to talk only about the West world. If we go further away, there is not a dysfunction, but chaos, different levels of brutality. Compared with other EU countries - all of whitch suffer, more or less, from the same problem - Greece represents an extreme case of dysfunctional democracy in the West world. Greece is an extreme case compared to other EU countries; but also Italy, for example, is not very different. 

The typical-morphological aspect of the party system and the aspect of political contents. What is real in the myth of «special case Greece» ? 

This Greek extremity has two aspects, and both are even fixed since many years: First, a typical-morphological aspect, ie a problematic party system, which in times of crisis becomes completely dysfunctional; some features of this problem already existed in the 19th century; then, it was, inter alia, the interwar fierce bipartisanship, the Civil War and its «tail» (the Cold War decades and 7 years of dictatorial regime), after the Junta a fierce clientelistic bipolar party system looting the state, finally, in the beginning of present crise, the illusive duopoly «memorandum vs contra-memorandum». Second, an aspect of political contents, which combines both (1) a capitalism of social inequality too high for European measures and (2) an economically inefficient capitalism, mainly because of the state's incapacity to exercise managerial-regulatory functions and to manage efficiently in the dimension of time the upward and downward cycles of the economy. As the impact of the Great World Economic Crisis of 1929-1930 in Greece was fiscal bankruptcy, so after the financial crisis of 2008, the Greek state was excluded from the credit markets and forced to resort to EU partners as last resort lenders.

To a large extent, these two sufficiently measurable components of the second aspect, namely (1) inequality and (2) managerial and economic inefficiency, are proportional magnitudes, at least in the political and social landscape of the European countries. Countries with greater social cohesion and more comprehensive welfare state - having institutions that could be characterized as inclusive, if we use the terminology of Daron Acemoğlu and James A. Robinson - are the most effective in terms of economic efficiency and managerial-regulatory capacity of the state, for example the Nordic. The opposite is countries with a capitalism of less social cohesion, ie with the greatest disparities, say with extractive institutions, according to the terminology of D. A. & J. A. R.; these are also the less effectiv capitalisms, for example whole Mediterranean area of ​​southern Europe, from the Atlantic and West Mediterranean to the Balkan Peninsula and the Black Sea: All the zone from Portugal to Italy (after operazione Mani Pulite and the destruction of traditional parties of Christian Democrats, Communists and Socialists, everything in the political system became rather worse), the former Yougoslav Rep. of Macedonia, up to Greece and Bulgaria.

Long-term social attitudes and institutional structures are actually much more important than the political ideologies  

Noteworthy is the following: it does not matter and does not affect this proportionality rule of the two measurable contents - nor the formal-morphological aspect of the party system of a country - what «socio-political system» (and what ideological background) dominated this country in the past decades. Thus, the most southern countries of the former communist eastern part of Europe, for example Bulgaria and Romania, have strong similarities with Greece and Italy, even related to the most «hard» deformities, such as widespread corruption, favoring of specific social milieus and systematic looting of the state for the sake of clientels. In the opposite of this, we found other countries outside the zone of these cultural attitudes and historical institutional structures, such as for example the Czech Republic, Slovakia or Slovenia; although also these had been communist countries, they are completely different in terms of social cohesion and economic efficiency - managerial capacity of the state. Long-term persistent societal attitudes and functional structures of institutions persistent in the long historical period, have in practice much more importance than political ideologies. Ultimately, what matters in practice are the results produced by attitudes and institutions.

©  IndexMundi

For consolidation, much determination and courage of political parties with a crucial role are needed

So if we want to continue talking in the context of representative democracy and that to be effective - in Europe and predominantly in Greece, it may be time for a very sharp shift in politics and policies: Not so much in terms of ideologies, but especially in terms of political attitudes and manners, as well as a change in fortitude of the political actors (parties and their personal) that are crucial for the fate of democracy. They need to undergo a shift to willingness, courage, determination, self-reliance, perseverance and strength, also to have a bit of ambition, to stop accommodating themselves as slaves, hostages or partners of the economically strong; to begin to act so as a «political animal» must act; and so, to start fixing the damage caused during the «thirty lost years» (Tony Judt). Surely, this will not be a comfortable political walk, nor a quick success project. 

Since we talked about the West world as a whole - for a European Union confronting the danger to become a toy in the of hands of rivals and challengers of democracy, and for America, which has already a president of the adventurist, Bonapartic kind - let us formulate the necessity and requirement of the times in American symbolic terms: Here as there, we must go from the «Herbert Hoovers» to «FD Roosevelts»,  while we avoid becoming - those avoiding to stay for a long - toys in the hands of «Trumps». 

Speaking about Greece, at the moment we do not see «Roosevelts» among Greek politicians, regardless of parties and ideological positions. Nor do we see significant signs of a coming strong positive, creative pressure from  the Greek people. But to abandon the hope, would be for us citizens the worst thing we can do now.

  

This article, besides due to other sources of stimulus, owes especially to studies by Claus Offe on policy and institutional failure, ungovernability and political crises.
See his books: Strukturprobleme des Kapitalistischen Staates - Aufsätze zur Politischen Soziologie (first ed. Frankfurt/Μ, 1972) and Contradictions of the Welfare State (London, 1984). Also the essay: «Unregierbarkeit. Zur Renaissance konservativer Krisentheorien», in: Jürgen Habermas (ed.), Stichworte zur geistigen Situation der Zeit, Vol. I Nation und Republik, Frankfurt/M, 1979, s. 294-318.

This article in Greek language: 

Δυσλειτουργίες της δημοκρατίας και των θεσμών του κράτους, στην «ειδική περίπτωση» Ελλάδα και αλλού στη Δύση

Claus Offe: Ungovernability 

  

Social Justice in the EU – Index Report 2016 (pdf) 

  

Tony Judt: What Is Living and What Is Dead in Social Democracy? (The New York Review of Books)

  

Zygmunt Bauman: How Neoliberalism Prepared The Way For Donald Trump (Social Europe)